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Clinicians are beings with finite minds and thus need to use simplified models of the world in making
decisions [1]. However, these models need not be oversimplified, as are the models encouraged by the
prevalent view of science, the Mechanistic Paradigm, which are articulated as rigid maxims. A more current
view of science, the Probabilistic Paradigm, encourages more complex models, which can be articulated as
the more flexible maxims used with insight by the wise clinician.
Some maxims help in clinical practice, and others too often become rigid rules. No
doubt much depends on skill, which the practitioner gains only with experience. But
the view of science that the medical student learns plays no small role in making the
acquisition of sufficient experience take longer and be perhaps more painful than is
needed.
The medical student learns that science is concerned with causal laws that
determine events with certainty, laws which themselves are established with certainty
by this or that crucial laboratory experiment. In this view the intuitions of the
investigator are the sort of subjectivity that had best be separated from the
"'objective" data that experiments can provide. This view or paradigm [2] takes its
inspiration from Newton's view [3] of what physics, the"queen" ofsciences, ought to
be. It became so successful inthe nineteenth century, when Newtonian mechanics and
the industrial age marched forward hand in hand, that it might well be called the
"Mechanistic Paradigm."
Emphasis upon this Mechanistic Paradigm does not stop in the preclinical years.
The founders of modern medicine took the elimination of uncertainty, "mere
probability," as an ideal to be practiced everywhere from the laboratory bench to the
patient's bedside. Medical practice was to aspire to what Isaac Newton would have
the physicist do in the laboratory. Thus Claude Bernard wrote:
I acknowledge my inability to understand why results taken from statistics are
called laws; for in my opinion scientific law can only be based on certainty, on
absolute determination, not on probability.
What a physician needs to know is whether his patient will recover and only
the search for scientific determinism can lead to his knowledge [4].
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The rules of thumb that the clinician first learns in his pursuit of medical wisdom
appear to give the straightforward and certain guidance that Newton would have
required of his physicist and Bernard ofhis physician. Thus, there are maxims such as
"Unexplained amenorrhea calls for X-ray study ofthe skull for pituitary tumor" [5].
Desiring to do the right thing, and anxious not to do the wrong thing, the intern or
resident all too naturally takes this sort ofmaxim as a rigid rule whose use discharges
his responsibility for decision making under these uncertain conditions.
When the maxim has the tone of scientific authority, it is easy enough to use it to
justify one's decisions, and to consider one's practice to be on a parwiththe use ofthe
deterministic causal laws that scientists discover. Byfollowingthis maxim, one can be
sure to put one's finger on the cause of amenorrhea, through performing the crucial
experiment-the X-ray. Nowhere is there room for one's intuitions regarding this
patient. These are considered "subjective," and thus not worthy of the sort of
attention one would pay to the "objective" data, the X-ray. No doubt maxims inthis
Mechanistic Paradigm style help the busy house officer to be decisive and give him
the feeling that he has gotten to the bottom of things. But relying strictly on such
maxims produces problems.
Since the above maxim was written, it has been dated by developments in
technology, such as computerized tomography. However, the uncertainty surround-
ing the use ofsuch maxims is not solely due to the pace at which betterdiagnostic and
therapeutic techniques are developed. The wise clinician knows well that not only
technology but patients, diseases, and their causes change in the course of time. He
keeps an eye out for causes which come and go as the disease progresses, causes that
can only be expressed in probabilistic terms. Thus, he avoids favoring one or even
several causes that are constantly before him because the diagnosis has been made. In
so doing, his treatment of the patient and the patient's disease is not guided solely by
the causes that were well articulated and influential when the original decision was
taken. Stated this way, it is easier to understand how the wise clinician avoids an
error that the house officer is prone to make.
For example, it was the experience of one of the authors that a child subjected to
an extensive series of diagnostic procedures for failure to thrive at home failed to
thrive in the hospital. The fact that he deteriorated in the hospital spurred ever more
forceful pursuit of a policy of invasive diagnostic testing. Faced with a downhill
clinical course, the house officers only redoubled their efforts to get to the bottom of
things and find a certain cause for the illness.
In this case, it is not enough to say that the house officers should have tried harder.
Nor is it enough to suggest that a rule ofthumb such as, "In a child under the age of
two presenting as a failure to thrive, in yourinvestigations try to avoid increasingthe
disease," be added to the set ofmaxims. Such a maxim has already been taught to the
beginning clinician: "Primum non nocere." One cannot learn a maxim for every
situation; even had a maxim been learned forthis situation, there is no guarantee that
it would have been used wisely.
The road open to the wise clinician, yet closed to the house officers because oftheir
adherence to the Mechanistic Paradigm of science, was to consider the possibility
that the set of causes of the child's failure to thrive at the outset had changed in the
course of hospitalization to include the stress of repeated invasive diagnostic
procedures. But the maxims which guided the house officers in their search for the
crucial piece of data, which the next diagnostic procedure (the "crucial experiment")
always seemed to promise, had no provision for reconsideration. The house officers'
discomfort with the road they had chosen, and their intuitions that perhaps it was
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time to stop testing for the cause of the failure to thrive, and to concentrate on
nutrition and other supportive care, were considered "subjective feelings" and
accordingly dismissed.
The wise clinician decides, but is aware that the causes he has acted on may change
in the course of time. He is mindful of how time, the twisting course of the patient's
disease, and changes in the patient's evaluation of his situation (as, for example, the
feelings of the terminal cancer patient about being alive change as pain increases)
affect what is being treated and what it is important to treat. Therefore, for the wise
clinician neither data nor maxims are a substitute for judgment. Neither can be
treated as if it were obtained from some crucial experiment which allows one to close
one's mind to alternative courses of action. Not only do data (such as X-rays) and
maxims (such as that cited above) require interpretation, but also their relevance to
the alternative paths being considered may be uncertain. Infact, choice ofthe path to
pursue initially in a case begins with the clinician's intuition as to what is probable
and what is valuable in this case.
The clinician is not only an observer but a participant [6] andjust as what he says
may affect the patient's values over time, so diagnostic procedures may affect what is
being treated. The very act of putting one's finger on "the cause" may contribute to
the coming and going of other causes.
The wise clinician learns all this in the course of his experience, and there exist
maxims which reflect this learning better than those stated earlier. For example,
"When symptoms of viral hepatitis withjaundice recurafter a year, additional causes
should be suspected" [7]. This maxim recognizes that diseases can change, and,
whether or not one had one's finger on the cause to beginwith, causes may come and
go in a manner that cannot be predicted with certainty at the outset. Maxims that
begin with probability, rather than with certainty, are morefaithful to the wisdom of
the experienced clinician.
Where do such insights, when embodied in the skillful use of a set of flexible
maxims, fit in the world of medical practice? Traditionally, they have been relegated
to the art of medicine, for the Mechanistic Paradigm, with its notions of laws with
certain causes, crucial experiments, and objectivity, encourages neither flexible
maxims nor their insightful use. However, there is another view of science that is
compatible with such insights. Although this view is influential in such diverse areas
as ecology, evolution, and economics [8], it finds its clearest statement in thephysics
of the twentieth century. Thegeneral view ofscience held by such quantum physicists
as Heisenberg [9] stands in stark contrast to the Mechanistic Paradigm of Newton.
This other view of science, the Probabilistic Paradigm, recognizes that it is in the
nature of things that causal laws speak in terms of the probabilities rather than the
necessities of events. In the realm of events that are of concern to medicine, such as
diseases, there is thus an element of irreducible statistical variability in the connec-
tions from causes to diseases. The result is that the course of the disease cannot be
predicted with complete confidence.
The Probabilistic Paradigm provides caveats not only about the limited extent to
which the course of a disease is predictable, but also about the limited reliability of
diagnostic tests. Making a diagnosis depends on some causal relation between the
cause of the disease and the sign that the doctor recognizes, whetherit be asymptom
or a test result. When we understand causal relations to be probabilistic, then there is
scientific justification for the intuition that diagnostic evidence is fallible. There is
thus not only room but also need for humanjudgment in deciding whetherto accept
the standard implication of even the best of tests.
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There is yet a further principle that the Probabilistic Paradigm of science
encourages us to be aware of. Where the Mechanistic Paradigm's Newtonian view of
science encourages us to take, as the norm, eradication of the influence of the
experimenter on the outcome of the experiment, the Uncertainty Principle of
Heisenberg encourages us to recognize that such influences are inevitable, and to be
attentive to their effects. In medical practicethis principle means keepingin mind the
role of the observer, the experimenter, or the diagnostic test, as a cause in the disease
process. The way we use our maxims, and the maxims themselves, must reflect our
knowledge that diagnostic procedures can have effects on the causes of the diseases,
or on the patient's experience of the disease.
The wise clinician's practice is consistent with the scientific principles of the
Probabilistic Paradigm. Specifically, his or her practice exemplifies an awareness of
the following principles: that a probabilistic reality contains within it a necessary
kernel of uncertainty as to the causes ofevents; that given this uncertainty, even the
best of tests can only point to causes as likely, rather than necessary; moreover, that
the very act of diagnosing a disease may alter the disease itself, for the scientist with
his instruments is not onlyan observer but also a participant, and how he participates
cannot be predicted with certainty.
There is no absolute substitute forthe experience which guides the wise clinician in
skillfully using flexible maxims. However, the Probabilistic Paradigm provides some
guideposts which, if followed, can shorten the road to clinical wisdom. The learning
clinician can be best guided by the experienced clinicianifthe latter can articulate his
insights in maxims which are flexible in form so that they can remind the user ofthe
principles of the Probabilistic Paradigm. A clinician who keeps such principles in
mind is more likely to use the maxims skillfully.
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